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Alternatives to Miranda: Preventing Coerced 
Confessions via the Convention  
Against Torture 
Linda M. Keller* 
INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses an international law alternative to 
Miranda’s preventive measures concerning coerced confessions.  
Others have explored Miranda’s effectiveness, or lack thereof, in 
preventing compelled confessions.  This article addresses another 
avenue for protection from coercion during interrogation: inter-
national treaty law.  It focuses on “War on Terror” detainees in 
U.S. custody as an example of interrogation subjects unlikely to 
be given the protection of Miranda.  This article draws on the ex-
ample of the hostile use of truth serum to illustrate the difficul-
ties in defining the term “torture” in the context of preventive in-
terrogation.1  Although there is general agreement that outright 
torture should be prohibited in most if not all circumstances, the 
meaning of the term “torture” is unsettled.  The internationally 
accepted definition of torture does not clearly set out which tac-
tics are prohibited.  The line between aggressive interrogation 
techniques and torture is difficult to discern, particularly when 
dealing with psychological pressure rather than physical coer-
cion.  The Miranda Court recognized the psychological coercion 
 
 * Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law.  The author would 
like to thank the participants and organizers of the Chapman Law Review Symposium: 
Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007).  This piece 
is based on remarks given at the conference.  The author also thanks Professors M.K.B. 
Darmer and Deven Desai for comments on an early draft of this piece. 
 1 For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see Linda M. Keller, Is Truth Serum 
Torture?, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2005).  In this article, I trace the history of the 
definition of torture from the drafting of the Convention Against Torture through the 
Bush Administration’s infamous torture memos.  In order to explore the understanding of 
mental torture, I evaluate the use and threatened use of truth serum as either torture or 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.  Here, I focus on the definition of torture in light 
of the apparent consensus that torture is unacceptable even in the War on Terror, but 
that the meaning of the term “torture” is unclear.  See, e.g., M.K.B. Darmer, Professor of 
Law, Chapman University School of Law, Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Sympo-
sium: Miranda at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow 
“Click here for Panel #1” hyperlink). 
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inherent in custodial interrogation and established prophylactic 
rules for its prevention.2  Where Miranda does not apply, the in-
ternational treaty on torture might serve a similar purpose. 
Part I of this article briefly summarizes the reasons for 
Miranda’s ineffectiveness or inapplicability to War on Terror de-
tainees.  Part II outlines the accusations of torture brought by 
detainees and the U.S. government’s position regarding coercive 
interrogation.  This part also highlights some of the key domestic 
laws prohibiting torture and their shortcomings.  Part III ex-
plains the definition of torture under the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (“CAT”)3 as modified by the United States via its 
ratification with reservations.  This part reveals a significant la-
cuna in the treaty by analyzing whether the use or threatened 
use of truth serum on War on Terror detainees would constitute 
torture.  Although the threatened use of truth serum violates 
CAT’s definition of torture as modified by the United States, the 
actual use of truth serum does not.  This paradoxical conclusion 
should not stand. 
I. MIRANDA AND WAR ON TERROR DETAINEES 
In Miranda, the Supreme Court faced “questions which go to 
the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the 
restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Con-
stitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”4 The Court was 
worried about the “incommunicado police-dominated atmos-
phere” of interrogation and “the evils it can bring.”5 In particular, 
the Court voiced concerns regarding physical brutality and psy-
chological coercion.6  Similarly, the so-called Global War on Ter-
ror being waged by the U.S. government raises concerns about 
the limits on interrogation methods when questioning detainees 
suspected of having knowledge that would help prevent a terror-
ist attack.  In the wake of 9/11, “the gloves came off.”7  The chal-
lenge is determining where to draw the line between aggressive 
questioning and unacceptable tactics in the War on Terror. 
In Miranda, the Court required “procedural safeguards” to 
ensure the privilege against self-incrimination, in the form of 
 
 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 3 G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter CAT]. 
 4 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. 
 5 Id. at 456. 
 6 Id. at 446–49. 
 7 See John Barry, Michael Hirsh & Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, 
NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 29, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/ 
(quoting the congressional testimony of Cofer Black, the onetime director of the CIA’s 
counterterrorism unit). 
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four warnings that are familiar to most Americans: that the sus-
pect has the right to remain silent; that any statements made af-
ter waiver of this right can be used as evidence against him; that 
he has the right to an attorney; and that this attorney would be 
appointed if he cannot afford to retain one.8  These warnings are 
not aimed merely at preventing the admission of coerced state-
ments into evidence at trial; they are also intended to prevent co-
ercion in the first place.  The Court determined that the Miranda 
warnings would serve as assurance that coercion would be eradi-
cated.9  Such coercion could take the form of physical beatings 
but, in modern interrogation, more often consists of psychological 
coercion.10  While recognizing society’s need for interrogation, the 
Court held that the measures were necessary to protect the privi-
lege while not unduly burdening law enforcement.11 
The Miranda warnings, however, might not apply to War on 
Terror detainees for several reasons.12  Miranda typically does 
not apply abroad, particularly to non-citizens.13  Even if Miranda 
were to apply, it would be of limited effectiveness.  Miranda 
would not be violated until the confession is introduced at trial,14 
offering little protection for War on Terror detainees that the 
government has no intention of prosecuting in criminal court. 
Moreover, the public safety exception to Miranda would likely 
apply to preventive interrogation; i.e., under New York v. 
Quarles, the failure to give Miranda warnings would be excused 
 
 8 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  For a discussion of the Miranda warnings in pop cul-
ture, see Panel Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Miranda at 40: Appli-
cations in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow “Click here for 
Panel #2” hyperlink) (noting that young Americans may be less able to recite the warning 
than those of an earlier TV-watching generation). 
 9 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447. 
 10 Id. at 448. 
 11 Id. at 479–83. 
 12 See generally Panel Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Miranda 
at 40: Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow “Click here for 
Panel #1” hyperlink). 
 13 For an extensive discussion of the limits of Miranda, see, for example, M.K.B. 
Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism, 12 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319 (2003) (advocating a foreign interrogation exception to 
Miranda combined with a due process “shocks the conscience” standard for interrogation 
techniques); Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confession Law—The 
International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by U.S. Investiga-
tors from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. 851 (2003) (discussing the applicability of 
confessional law abroad, including Fifth Amendment self-incrimination and due process 
involuntary confession rules); Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—the Interna-
tional Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New 
Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002) (arguing for modifications to 
Miranda for law enforcement officials interrogating suspects abroad). 
 14 See, e.g., Darmer, supra note 13, at 348–51 (discussing the Fifth Amendment as a 
trial right); see also Keller, supra note 1, at 559–63 (same). 
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if the interrogation were aimed at obtaining information crucial 
to protecting the public, like the location of a gun—or a dirty 
bomb.15 
In addition, other exceptions might apply, as in the case of 
Jose Padilla, the alleged dirty bomber who was arrested at Chi-
cago’s O’Hare airport.16  Padilla was eventually released from in-
definite detention as an “enemy combatant” and criminally 
charged with terrorist activities having little to do with the ini-
tial dirty bomb allegations.17  He then moved to suppress the 
statements made during the interrogation at the airport on the 
ground that the FBI agents failed to give Miranda warnings.  
The district court denied the motion because the interrogation 
was not “custodial” under special rules for border questioning.18  
The court cited the Eleventh Circuit’s recognition of a border-
interrogation exception to Miranda.19 
II. TORTURE IN THE U.S. “WAR ON TERROR” 
Where Miranda warnings are inapplicable or ineffective, 
other standards might serve the purpose of preventing coerced 
confessions.  In particular, CAT, the leading international treaty 
on torture, aims to prevent and punish torture.  Torture has be-
come a key flashpoint in the War on Terror.  The U.S. govern-
ment has repeatedly asserted that it does not utilize torture even 
during preventive interrogation of War on Terror detainees.20  In 
its most recent report to the monitoring body created under CAT, 
the United States reiterated this point.  “The President of the 
United States has made clear that the United States stands 
against and will not tolerate torture under any circumstances.”21  
Acknowledging the fundamental changes wrought by the 9/11 at-
tacks, the U.S. report stated: “In fighting terrorism, the U.S. re-
mains committed to respecting the rule of law, including the U.S. 
 
 15 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657–58 (1984) (excusing the failure to give 
warnings where police were asking arrestee about the location of a gun). 
 16 United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE, 2006 WL 3678567, at *1 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 17, 2006). 
 17 See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Jerry Markon, 
Court Bars Transfer of Padilla to Face New Terrorism Charges, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 
2005, at A1 (discussing the refusal of the appellate court to transfer Padilla due to the 
government’s changing rationales for holding Padilla).  The Supreme Court subsequently 
allowed the transfer to go forward.  See Hanft v. Padilla, 126 S. Ct. 978 (2006) (mem.). 
 18 United States v. Padilla, No. 04-60001-CR-COOKE, 2006 WL 3678567, at *7 (S.D. 
Fla. Nov. 17, 2006) (describing a more limited definition of “custody” at the border). 
 19 Id.   
 20 See Keller, supra note 1, at 552–53 & n.150. 
 21 See Comm. against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention: Second Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1999: 
Addendum: United States of America, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1 (Jan. 13, 
2006). 
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Constitution, federal statutes, and international treaty obliga-
tions, including the Torture Convention.”22 
There have been, however, widespread allegations of the use 
of tactics tantamount to torture.23  Moreover, the infamous “tor-
ture memos” interpreted the definition of torture so narrowly 
that tactics commonly considered torture were excluded; they 
also asserted a Commander-in-Chief exception to the laws pro-
hibiting torture.24  Although these tactics and memos have been 
partially repudiated,25 it is not clear that the United States pro-
hibits all acts that likely constitute torture under international 
law. 
Even recent legislation meant to quell the controversy over 
U.S. torture does not amount to a clear repudiation of coercive in-
terrogation.26  For example, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
(a.k.a. the McCain Amendment) provides: (1) no one under the 
custody or control of the Department of Defense shall be subject 
to interrogation tactics not authorized by the U.S. Army Field 
 
 22 Id. at ¶ 4. 
 23 The various techniques approved and later rescinded by the Department of De-
fense included coercive techniques like stress positions and waterboarding.  See, e.g., 
Julian G. Ku, Ali v. Rumsfeld: Challenging the President’s Authority to Interpret Custom-
ary International Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 371, 380–86 (2006). 
 24 Two recent articles provide powerful analysis of the torture memos and related 
Bush Administration policies, calling into question U.S. adherence to the ban on torture.  
See José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175 (2006); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni, The Institutionalization of Torture under the Bush Administration, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 396 n.33 (2006); see also Keller, supra note 1, at 550–56 (discussing 
differences in defining torture in two key Bush Administration memos); cf. U.N. Comm. 
Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 
of the Convention ¶ 24, CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (July 25, 2006) (urging the United States to re-
scind interrogation techniques that constitute torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment).  For the memos themselves and related materials, see THE 
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel 
eds., 2005). 
 25 Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. &  POL’Y 455, 462–63 (2005). 
 26 This article focuses on legislation related to criminal penalties.  Civil remedies 
include the Torture Victim Protection Act, which is limited to torture by foreign officials.  
See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256 § 2, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) (allowing U.S. citizens and aliens to seek 
damages for torture or extrajudicial killings but limiting its jurisdiction to acts committed 
by those acting under the authority of foreign nations). The Alien Tort Claims Act pro-
vides a remedy for aliens claiming torture as a violation of the laws of nations. See Alien 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (stating that “district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law 
of nations or a treaty of the United States”); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 
880 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that torture constitutes a violation of the law of nations for the 
purposes of the alien tort statute).  Although the Alien Tort Claims Act might cover non-
citizen War on Terror detainees, it is unlikely to provide a sufficient remedy.  See, e.g., 
Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 763–70 (2006) (dis-
cussing sovereign immunity and the exclusivity of the Federal Tort Claims Act as obsta-
cles to civil suits against U.S. government officials).  Other civil tort remedies are also 
unlikely to be effective.  See generally id. 
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Manual on Intelligence Interrogation; and (2) no one in the cus-
tody or control of the U.S. government shall be subject to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.27  While these 
two steps seem like progress, both are problematic. 
First, the legislation does not prevent changes to the Army 
Field Manual.28  The Field Manual currently bans tactics like 
waterboarding, forced sexual positions or nudity, beatings, using 
military working dogs, and hypothermia or heat injury.29  Yet 
other disputed techniques like extended periods of forced stand-
ing are not listed.  In addition, it appears that there is a classi-
fied section of the Field Manual, leading to the question of 
whether there is a waiver provision or exceptions to the list of 
prohibited techniques.30  Second, the scope of the ban on cruel 
treatment is unclear.  Since cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment is a lesser version of torture, it seems that the Detainee 
Treatment Act would encompass torture as well.  But cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment is defined in the 
Act in terms of the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel or unusual 
punishment.31  In other words, it might only cover acts that can 
be considered “punishment.”  Coercive interrogation, as opposed 
to post-conviction punishment, might be excluded altogether.32  
In addition, the applicability of Eighth Amendment cases to pre-
ventive interrogation is unclear.33 
Other positions of the government call into question its 
commitment to banning torture.34  Perhaps most significantly, 
the President’s signing statement accompanying his signature on 
the Detainee Treatment Act seems to reserve the right to ignore 
the legislation to the extent he deems it necessary.  The signing 
 
 27 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Div. A, Title X, 119 Stat. 
2680, 2739 (West). 
 28 See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: INTERROGATION OF 
DETAINEES: OVERVIEW OF THE MCCAIN AMENDMENT 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33655.pdf. 
 29 U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL FM 2-22.3 (FM 34–52): HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 
COLLECTOR OPERATIONS at 5-21, § 5-75 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/ 
army/fm2-22-3.pdf. 
 30 Eric Schmitt, New Army Rules May Snarl Talks with McCain on Detainee Issue, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at A1. 
 31 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1003(d), 119 Stat. 2680, 
2739–40. 
 32 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 1, at 557–59. 
 33 See GARCIA, supra note 28, at 4–6 (discussing precedents from the criminal justice 
system). 
 34 This article does not address the U.S. practice of extraordinary rendition, i.e., 
“outsourcing torture” to other countries by extrajudicially capturing (usually abroad) and 
rendering subjects to other countries known to use torture.  For an excellent analysis of 
this violation of international law in the U.S. War on Terror, see Leila Nadya Sadat, 
Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites: Extraordinary Rendition under International Law, 37 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 309 (2006). 
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statement provides:  
  The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the 
Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitu-
tional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitu-
tional limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving 
the shared objective . . . of protecting the American people from fur-
ther terrorist attacks.35 
In addition, the Detainee Treatment Act provides for a good-
faith defense for interrogators and, as amended by the Military 
Commissions Act, requires the government to pay for counsel and 
court costs, bail, and other incidental expenses for the accused.36  
The Military Commissions Act specifies that the good-faith de-
fense applies retroactively to cover the entire period from 9/11 to 
the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act.37  The Military 
Commissions Act also appears to allow evidence, but not state-
ments, obtained via torture to be admitted in military trials of 
enemy combatants.38  Statements obtained through coercion 
short of clear torture are admissible in certain circumstances.39  
It is striking that the Military Commissions Manual specifically 
states, “Statements obtained by torture are not admissible (10 
U.S.C. § 948r(b)), but statements ‘in which the degree of coercion 
is disputed’ may be admitted if reliable, probative, and the ad-
mission would best serve the interests of justice.”40  Given the 
disputed definition of torture and the circumstances of preventive 
interrogation, it is likely that most, if not all, proffers of state-
ments will involve disputes regarding the degree of coercion.  Be-
cause the admissibility of statements hinges on the distinction 
between torture and cruel treatment, it seems absurd to expect 
that the level of coercion would not be disputed. 
 
 35 Press Release, The White House, President’s Statement on Signing of H.R. 2863, 
the “Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurri-
canes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006” (Dec. 30, 2005), available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html#. 
 36 GARCIA, supra note 28, at 7–10. 
 37 Id. at 9. 
 38 Stephen F. Rohde, Partner at Rohde & Victoroff and Former President of ACLU of 
Southern California, Remarks at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Miranda at 40: 
Applications in a Post-Enron, Post-9/11 World (Jan. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.chapman.edu/LawReview/symposium2007_webcast.asp (follow “Click here for 
Panel #1” hyperlink). 
 39 JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CRS REPORT, THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006: 
ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL RULES AND COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS DOD RULES AND THE 
UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 22 (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/natsec/RL33688.pdf (discussing standards for admitting statements obtained through 
coercion not constituting torture). 
 40 U.S. SEC’Y OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSIONS MANUAL ¶ 1(g), at I-1 to I-2, available 
at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/pdf/militarycommissionsmanual.pdf (citation omitted) (quoting 
the Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c)). 
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Finally, the Detainee Treatment Act does not criminalize the 
acts it prohibits.  In fact, the Military Commissions Act strips the 
federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims of torture from War 
on Terror detainees.  It provides that “no court . . . shall have ju-
risdiction to hear . . . action[s] against the United States or its 
agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treat-
ment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of alien enemy combat-
ants.41  “Thus, the Act eliminates existing means of challenge 
while not providing for alternative means of enforcing whatever 
prohibitions against torture it incorporates.”42 
Moreover, laws predating the passage of the Detainee 
Treatment Act and Military Commissions Act that criminalize 
torture are insufficient.  The two major statutes regarding prose-
cution of torture are the Federal Torture Statute and the War 
Crimes Act.43  The Federal Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, 
criminalizes the commission or attempted commission of torture 
outside U.S. territories, commonwealths and possessions.44  The 
War Crimes Act criminalizes certain acts, committed inside or 
outside the United States, by or against members of the Armed 
Services.45  As amended by the Military Commissions Act, the 
War Crimes Act prohibits certain violations of Common Article 3 
of the Geneva Conventions, including torture.46  But the War 
Crimes Act had not been used as of 2006.47  The first and only 
prosecution under the Federal Torture Statute charged Charles 
Taylor, Jr. with torture for acts committed in Liberia.48 
The Detainee Treatment Act’s new defense for interrogators, 
as described above, relates to possible prosecution under the 
 
 41 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 
2636. 
 42 W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Holding the Center of the Law of Armed 
Conflict, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 852, 854 (2006). 
 43 For a more extensive discussion of U.S. legislation related to torture, including 
immigration law, see Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, 3 FLOERSHEIMER CENTER OCCA-
SIONAL PAPERS SERIES 25 (2005), available at http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/ 
cms/uploadedFiles/FLOERSHEIMER/Defining%20Torture.pdf.  Although some military 
prosecutions have also dealt with mistreatment of detainees, for example at Abu Ghraib, 
very few have been held accountable.  See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 24, at 406–11 (dis-
cussing the lack of investigations and prosecutions for war crimes or torture within the 
military justice system). 
 44 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A (2006). 
 45 Id. § 2441. 
 46 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 
2633 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2441).   
 47 See R. Jeffrey Smith, War Crimes Act Changes Would Reduce Threat of Prosecu-
tion, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2006, at A1 (discussing Military Commissions Act amendments 
restricting the scope of crimes covered by the War Crimes Act, particularly the exclusions 
of humiliating or degrading treatment). 
 48 See Siobhan Morrissey, Torture Law Gets First Test, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT, Dec. 
15, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/d15taylor.html. 
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Federal Torture Statute or the War Crimes Act.  Yet, given the 
lack of prosecutions under either piece of legislation, it is hard to 
imagine a sudden spurt of charges against interrogators accused 
of going too far in the War on Terror.  But if such prosecutions do 
arise, the meaning of “torture” will be crucial.  The definitions of 
torture under both Acts are similar to the CAT definition, as 
modified by the U.S. conditions attached to the treaty.49 
III. TRUTH SERUM AS TORTURE 
As noted above, the United States has ratified CAT with a 
package of conditions requiring certain interpretations of terms 
in the treaty.  The definition of torture under CAT, as modified 
by the United States, does not eliminate the ambiguity of the 
terms of the statute.  This Part explores one possible form of 
mental torture to illustrate the complexity of the position that 
“difficult interrogation” is acceptable but “torture” is not.  This 
Part posits a scenario of preventive interrogational truth se-
rum—truth serum used to obtain information in order to prevent 
another terrorist attack.50  It shows that the current understand-
ing of torture leads to an untenable conclusion: the threat of us-
ing truth serum constitutes torture, but the actual use of truth 
serum does not. 
The Court in Miranda was concerned with the unknowing, 
incompetent, or coerced waiver of the right to remain silent.  Its 
warnings aimed at ensuring that statements made while in cus-
tody were the result of an independent decision to speak, rather 
than the coercive atmosphere.51  This ability to make an inde-
pendent decision to speak is destroyed during the administration 
of a truth serum that lives up to its name. 
Although it may seem that the discussion of truth serum be-
longs in the realm of science fiction rather than legal analysis, it 
is not as far-fetched as it seems.  For example, after 9/11, it was 
stated that it was “[t]ime to [t]hink [a]bout [t]orture”—including 
truth serum.52  This call came from Newsweek’s columnist, Jona-
than Alter, who also stated, “Short of physical torture, there’s 
 
 49 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 5, 120 Stat. at 2633; see also GARCIA, su-
pra note 28, at 6–7 (discussing minor distinctions regarding the level of pain and suffering 
and the intent requirement for torture and cruel treatment under the War Crimes Act as 
amended by the Military Commissions Act); Keller, supra note 1, at 548–49 (pointing to 
the value of determining U.S. torture in terms of mobilizing shame against such prac-
tices). 
 50 Keller, supra note 1, at 533–34.  Although cruel, inhuman and degrading treat-
ment is also banned by CAT, the questions raised by this related issue are beyond the 
scope of this article.  See id. at 566–69. 
 51 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966). 
 52 Jonathan Alter, Time to Think about Torture, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 2001, at 45. 
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always sodium pentothal (‘truth serum’).  The FBI is eager to try 
it, and deserves the chance.”53  Former CIA and FBI director Wil-
liam Webster urged the Pentagon to use truth serum drugs on 
terror detainees if necessary to obtain information that “would 
save lives or prevent some catastrophic consequence.”54  And 
there have been allegations that various governmental agencies 
took his advice.  For example, Jose Padilla—the so-called dirty-
bomber mentioned earlier—alleges that truth serum was used on 
him while he was being held incommunicado as an enemy com-
batant.55 
Truth serum is a fascinating example for several reasons.  
First, the hostile use of truth serum is often assumed to be some-
thing less than torture.  Second, it provides an opening to explore 
mental rather than physical torture.  Finally, it illustrates some 
shortcomings in the way torture is currently defined.  For pur-
poses of discussion, imagine an actual “truth serum,” a next-
generation sodium pentothal that lives up to the term “truth 
drug.”  This truth serum would not cause any physical pain, but 
would render a subject unable to resist while interrogated—she 
would be helpless to tell a lie or remain silent.  She would answer 
questions with what she believes to be the truth, her will over-
come by the perfect truth serum. 
There is no evidence that such a drug exists now.  But it is 
likely that the government is working on it, as it has in the past.  
For example, the U.S. government has tested truth serums and 
other substances on unwitting subjects in notorious projects like 
MKULTRA.56  Scientists differ on whether various drugs could 
ever wholly overcome the will of a person.  But for purposes of 
discussion, assume that those scientists who predict that such a 
thing is possible are correct.  If truth serum does not work, that 
in and of itself argues against its use.  This article posits a physi-
cally safe and reliable truth drug in order to limit the discussion 
 
 53 See id. (describing the 9/11 attacks as so horrifying that the U.S. should consider 
using methods of interrogation formerly deemed unconscionable, but not physical tor-
ture). 
 54 See, e.g., Ann Scott Tyson, US Task: Get inside Head of Captured bin Laden Aide,  
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 4, 2002, at 11 (noting that former FBI and CIA director 
William Webster and others indicated that the United States is justified in using sodium 
pentothal and other truth drugs, but not physical torture, to prevent catastrophic terror-
ist attacks), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0404/p01s03-uspo.html.  For 
other calls to consider the use of torture, see Keller, supra note 1, at 522–28. 
 55 Richard A. Serrano, Padilla Terror Case Gets Closer Look, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2006, at A18 (describing claims of brutal mistreatment including that Padilla was “in-
jected with truth-serum drugs to coerce him to talk”). 
 56 The CIA’s Project MKULTRA tested various drugs aimed at behavior modifica-
tion, including the use of LSD on unwitting subjects; the project allegedly ended after one 
subject died as a result of the experiment.  See Keller, supra note 1, at 532. 
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to potential mental harm.57 
As noted above, many commentators have assumed that 
truth serum is not torture.58  But the complex definition of tor-
ture requires more in-depth exploration of the possibility that the 
use or threatened use of truth serum constitutes torture. CAT de-
fines torture as 
any act 
by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person 
for such purposes as 
  obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, 
  or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, 
  or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.59 
When the United States ratified CAT, it attached several 
conditions, known as Reservations, Understandings and Declara-
tions (“U.S. RUDs”), including an “Understanding” regarding the 
interpretation of “mental pain or suffering” in CAT.60  The United 
States interpreted mental harm as follows: 
mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or 
resulting from: 
(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical 
pain or suffering; 
(2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or 
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calcu-
lated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; 
(3) the threat of imminent death; 
 
 57 See, e.g., David Brown, Some Believe ‘Truth Serums’ Will Come Back, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 20, 2006, at A8 (discussing the history of the development of truth serum and differ-
ing opinions on whether current efforts are ongoing or succeeding); see also Keller, supra 
note 1, at 531–32 (describing the unreliability of publicly-known truth serums like sodium 
pentothal and CIA efforts to create an actual truth serum). 
 58 See supra notes 53–54; see also Keller, supra note 1, at 527–28. 
 59 CAT, supra note 3, at art. 1 (formatting altered). 
 60 See 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).  Although this article accepts 
the U.S. RUDs regarding the interpretation of torture, there are serious questions as to 
whether the U.S. RUDs are improper and severable reservations and/or violative of cus-
tomary international law.  See, e.g., Keller, supra note 1, at 540–44 (examining the valid-
ity of the U.S. RUDs); Alvarez, supra note 24 (contending that the U.S. interpretation of 
torture is at odds with the treaty’s object and purpose of preventing torture). 
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or 
(4) the threat that another person will imminently be subject to death, 
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administratio[n] or applica-
tion of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to dis-
rupt profoundly the senses or personality.61 
In other words, the Understanding itself seems to open the 
door to finding that truth serum is torture.  A perfect truth se-
rum would be a mind-altering drug that disrupts the personality 
of the subject by negating the core of the person—her ability to 
control her own mind and act on her beliefs.62  This ability is 
worth protection, as the Miranda Court recognized.  A decision to 
speak to interrogators should be an independent judgment, 
rather than a product of compulsion.63 
But would truth serum inflict “severe” mental pain or suffer-
ing, causing “prolonged mental harm”?  While at first glance it 
might not appear likely, consider this example.  Think of a high-
level FBI agent who knows of an al Qaeda sleeper cell in the 
United States that is planning a future attack on a large U.S. 
city. Before the government can take action, al Qaeda kidnaps 
the agent and injects truth serum.  The agent reveals the gov-
ernment’s plan to arrest the cell and thwart its attack.  Armed 
with the knowledge gained from the use of truth serum, the cell 
evades arrest and immediately detonates a dirty bomb at the 
Sears Tower in Chicago.  Tens of thousands are killed and 
maimed through shrapnel, radiation, and the resulting panic. 
The contamination shuts down the city, throwing the nation’s 
economy into a tailspin.  While undergoing the waking night-
mare of the truth serum session, the agent realizes that his co-
erced “confession” will lead to the deaths of thousands of innocent 
people.64 
Will the FBI agent suffer severe, prolonged mental harm?  I 
would say that it is very likely.  The agent might well suffer sig-
nificant emotional trauma from both the hostile mind control and 
the horrific results of his inability to withhold the information.  
The loss of personal integrity will likely have long-lasting detri-
mental effects.65  In a different context, the Supreme Court 
stated, “Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought 
 
 61 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (formatting altered). 
 62 See Keller, supra note 1, at 589–93. 
 63 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966) (discussing the need for an inde-
pendent decision to speak). 
 64 Keller, supra note 1, at 586. 
 65 See Keller, supra note 1, at 585–88 (discussing the mental trauma of coerced 
speech as being tantamount to mental rape); id. at 603–05 (discussing Supreme Court 
opinions regarding autonomy). 
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of giving government the power to control men’s minds.”66  In the 
international context, acts that have been found to inflict severe 
mental pain include making the victim believe that family mem-
bers will be harmed if he fails to cooperate, or forcing him to 
watch another person being harmed.67  Compared to these prece-
dents, the hostile use of truth serum might well cause severe 
mental pain lasting more than a fleeting moment.  Given the 
harm that his words have caused, the emotional trauma is likely 
to result in post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) or similar 
mental harm—trauma that the U.S. government has cited as ex-
amples of sufficiently prolonged mental pain and suffering.68  
Thus, the use of truth serum is likely to meet the mental harm 
requirement.  Furthermore, based on the U.S. interpretation of 
mental harm, the threatened administration might also meet the 
severe mental pain or suffering requirement.69 
In order to constitute torture, however, this severe mental 
pain must be intentionally inflicted for certain purposes by offi-
cial actors.  The latter part is easy in preventive interrogational 
truth serum—truth serum is clearly being used by U.S. officials 
for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession.  The in-
tent requirement, by contrast, is more difficult.  The CAT defini-
tion specifically requires that the harm be inflicted for the pur-
pose of obtaining the information.70  Moreover, the United States 
requires “specific intent”71—ruling out accidental or incidental 
pain.  This is where a major shortcoming of the definition comes 
into play.  By requiring intentional infliction of pain in order to 
obtain the information, CAT rules out some interrogation meth-
ods that should be considered torture. 
Specifically, although the hostile administration of truth se-
rum might cause severe mental harm, the harm is not intention-
ally inflicted to obtain the confession.  The harm is a mere side 
effect.  The truth serum, not the pain, is intended to fulfill the 
purpose.  The hostile use of truth serum is therefore likely not an 
“act by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally in-
 
 66 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565, 568 (1969) (striking down criminalization of 
private possession of obscene materials). 
 67 See Keller, supra note 1, at 581–82, and cases cited therein.  For an excellent 
analysis of relevant definitions and precedents from international tribunals, see William 
A. Schabas, The Crime of Torture and the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 349 (2005). 
 68 See Keller, supra note 1, at 587–88. 
 69 For a more extensive discussion of threatened administration of mind-altering 
drugs and severe mental pain or suffering, see Keller, supra note 1, at 593–95. 
 70 See CAT, supra note 4, at 197.  
 71 See 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (”[A]n act must be specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering . . . .”). 
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flicted” for the purpose of obtaining information.72  The pain is 
not designed to extract the confession, the truth serum is.  If 
there were some way to eliminate the anticipated side effect of 
mental pain, the interrogator would still get the necessary infor-
mation because the truth serum causes the divulgence, irrespec-
tive of any simultaneous mental pain.73 
 Paradoxically, the lesser act of threatening to administer 
truth serum would meet the intentional infliction requirement.  
The threat is an act by which the interrogator deliberately in-
flicts mental pain in order to achieve her purpose.  The pain itself 
is the main objective, the driving force behind the confession, 
whether it is the pain of intense anxiety or the pain of antici-
pated mind invasion.  Without it, the interrogator will not obtain 
the information.  The whole idea behind a threat—“we have ways 
of making you talk”—is to terrify and traumatize the subject into 
talking.74 
Thus, there seems to be a strange loophole in the definition 
of torture—one that allows the use of truth serum, but not the 
threat of it.  Of course, this creates a perverse incentive for inter-
rogators to go straight to the use of truth serum.  I believe that a 
better understanding of torture would also cover methods like 
truth serum, where the substance causes the subject to speak, 
but mental anguish is an anticipated side effect.  There are many 
other reasons why the hostile use of truth serum and other coer-
cive interrogation tactics should be banned; reasons ranging from 
moral theory to fear of reprisals to reputational damage to the 
fact that they are banned by other international law.75  The cur-
rent lacuna in the definition of torture only adds to the conclu-
sion that coercive tactics should be abandoned. 
CONCLUSION 
Although Miranda may not protect terror detainees from co-
erced confessions, other laws can.  In particular, the United 
States has agreed to abide by the international prohibition 
against torture.  The infamous—and now withdrawn—torture 
memos aside, the government professes to uphold the ban on tor-
ture.  It can show this commitment by ruling out methods like 
truth serum.  The recent Detainee Treatment Act prohibits some 
of the most outrageous methods like waterboarding,76 but does 
 
 72 See CAT, supra note 4, at 197.  
 73 See Keller, supra note 1, at 595–601. 
 74 Id. at 601–03. 
 75 For a more extensive discussion of other bases for banning coercive techniques, 
see id. at 603–12. 
 76 152 CONG. REC. S10413 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of Sen. McCain) (“I 
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not go far enough.  Similar mixed messages are evident in the 
President’s signing statement and within the Military Commis-
sions Act, which allows statements obtained through compulsion 
short of undisputed torture.77  A more comprehensive approach is 
necessary to regain our reputation as a promoter, not a violator, 
of human rights.  In order to win the “Global War on Terror,” co-
operation is required—cooperation that will not be forthcoming if 
the United States appears to waver regarding the absolute pro-
hibition of preventive interrogational torture.78 
 
am confident that the categories included in this section will criminalize certain interro-
gation techniques, like waterboarding and other techniques that cause serious pain or suf-
fering . . . .”). 
 77 See supra Part II. 
 78 See, e.g., Keller, supra note 1, at 608–09 (discussing examples of the U.S.’s inabil-
ity to achieve foreign policy goals due to criticism over alleged use of torture). 
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